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Analytical framework: Compilation of approaches














Table: Theoretical approaches in the compliance literature (according to Börzel et al. (2003)
Analytical framework: Adapted compliance model
Intentional non-compliance
(aiming at the political will)
Uninentional non-compliance
(aiming at the ability)
Perspective Top → Down Bottom → Up Top → Down Bottom → Up
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Assessment of compliance mechanisms
 Internalization did not lead to compliance (as seen in the financial and 
economic crisis)
 Basically no ex ante compliance through management foreseen in terms of 
capacity-building as an ex ante mechanism
 Ex post compliance through management only in case of serious difficulties 




Legal Framework for 
an EMU Fiscal 
Capacity
Legal Questions
 Payment side I: Is there is legal base?
 Payment side II: Limitations for transfer of 
funding set by Article 125(1) TFEU (the so-called 
‘No Bailout’ clause)
 Financing side I: Does EU budget law allow for 
additional funding earmarked for the use by the 
fiscal capacity?
 Financing side II: Does EU budget law allow for 
a differentiated integration?



















































e Definition of the 
revenue
 Contributions by 
Member States
 Own EU tax
Earmarking of 
the expenditure
Act 1 Act 2 Act 3
Payment side
Payment side: Is there a legal base?
 What is the aim that is predominantely 
pursued?
– Reinforcing multilateral surveillance?
• Article 121(6) TFEU
– Macroeconomic stabilisation in crisis times?
• Article 122(2) TFEU (used for the EFSM)
• Only when ‘exceptional occurences’
• Only ‘under certain conditions’, no automatization
– Reducing economic/social disparities?
• Article 175(3) TFEU (used for the EGF)
– Fallback option: Article 352(1) TFEU
Payment side: Limitations set by Article 125
 Issue of Article 125(1) TFEU (‘no bail-out’ clause)
– General principle that EU does not finance MS
• EU may only transfer funding to MS if there is an explicit legal base 
(such as e.g. in the case of cohesion policy)
• Otherwise, Article 125(1) TFEU sets the limits for any other transfer
– CJEU, Case C-370/12, Pringle
– ‘Article 125(1) TFEU does not prohibit the granting of financial assistance […] 
provided that the conditions attached to such assistance are such as to prompt 
that Member State to implement sound budgetary policies’
– Issue of conditionality
• Not required by the wording of Article 125(1) TFEU
• ‘Pingle’ confirmed the legality of ESM, which was built on the 
principle of conditionality
Payment side: Limitations set by Article 125
– Understanding Article 125(1) TFEU
• EU/MS shall not be liable for or assume commitments of other MS
• MS are solely responsible for sound budgetary policies
– Sound budgetary policies of the participating countries as a precondition for 
financial stability in a currency area
– Sound budgetary policies means that state budgets may not be used to 
finance the consequences of unsound economic policies
• Financial assistance is acceptable under Article 125(1) TFEU if it does 
not diminish a MS’s incentive to conduct sound budgetary policies
– Maastricht principle: Market pressure prompts Member States to conduct 
sound economic policies since the financial consequences of unsound 
economic policies will be costly to refinance on the markets
– Applying to financial assistance: As long as it can be ensured that unsound 
budgetary policies can be avoided through mechanisms prompting sound 
economic policies, financial assistance is acceptable
– Not by definition: Conditionality
Financing side
Financing side
 Two ways of designing the financing side
– (1)  Within the EU budget
• Earmarking revenue for the exclusive use of the FC ( External 
assigned revenue, Article 21(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 966/2012)
• External assigned revenue is excluded from MFF ceilings
• External assigned revenue is considered to be ‘other revenue’ in 
terms of Article 311 TFEU ( no change of Own Resources Decision)
• Legal base: Article 352(1) TFEU
– (2)  Dedicated fund outside EU budget
• Establishment of an agency with an own distinct budget
• Control by budgetary authorities (EP/Council) comparable to EU 
budget law in order not to circumvent institutional balance
• Legal base: Article 352(1) TFEU or IGA
Financing side
 Is a Euro area budget possible?
– Revenue
• Article 332 TFEU: Expenditure shall be borne by the participating MS
• Example: ‘High Flux Reactor’ (Council Decision 2012/709/Euratom)
– Expenditure
• Principle: The revenue shall be used without distinction to finance all 
expenditure entered in the general budget of the European Union
• Exception: Earmarking
– Certain revenue is assigned by the basic legal act on the creation of the revenue 
to a certain budget line 
– Example: Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2013 on the enforcement of 
budgetary surveillance in the Euro area:
“The interest earned by the Commission […] shall constitute other revenue as referred to in Article 
311 TFEU and shall be assigned to the EFSF.”
Financing side
 Possibility to raise debt
– Principle: EU is not allowed to raise debt in order to finance 
the general budget of the Union
– Precedents: e.g. EFSM may raise debt (Article 6(3) of 
Regulation (EU) No 407/2010) 
– EU is allowed to enter into borrowing-and-lending 
operations for a specific and predefined purpose, which 
may not lead to an indirect financing of the general budget
– Legal base: Legal base of the legal act establishing the fiscal 
capacity
European Research 












Erasmus University Rotterdam 
(Scientific Director EURO-CEFG)













Delft University of Technology
René Repasi
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
(Scientific Coordinator EURO-CEFG)
Casper De Vries
Erasmus University Rotterdam
